Secret ASIO report warns of journalist spies operating in Australia, infiltrating media

A confidential ASIO report warns international spies are posing as journalists and targeting members of the media here to help steal classified information and conduct foreign interference against Australia.

The recent ASIO Intelligence Assessment marked “OFFICIAL: Sensitive”, and seen by The Nightly, urges Australian government agencies to closely manage all “engagement” with news reporters to “defend against espionage”.

“Journalists undertake a range of activities that are similar to the activities of foreign intelligence officers, including collecting information and cultivating relationships with sources,” the ASIO document states.

“Their access and activities can be exploited by foreign intelligence services to conduct or facilitate espionage and foreign interference, as well as to provide cover for intelligence officers and their operations.”

“In order to defend against espionage involving journalists, it is important to understand the threat, identify the risks and manage the risks,” the four-page document advises Australian government agencies.

It details how journalism “provides effective cover” for foreign adversaries to seek “privileged insider insights” into Australia’s politics, foreign partnerships, public and private sector projects, science and technology, and economic and defence topics.

“Some work conducted by journalists can be difficult to distinguish from intelligence activity, increasing the challenge for security services in identifying foreign intelligence service activity,” the assessment dated June 18 also notes.

According to ASIO foreign spies use two primary methods to conduct operations: by placing intelligence officers in positions within media organisations or by recruiting or using genuine journalists to fulfill tasking on behalf of the overseas intelligence service.

Pointedly, the ASIO Intelligence Assessment also notes that “Foreign intelligence services can exploit state media to embed officers under journalistic cover in Australia and internationally.”

“State-affiliated media organisations are uniquely effective for this purpose, as they can be directly compelled by their home governments to facilitate intelligence objectives,” the assessment warns.

“Established journalists are seen by foreign intelligence services as valuable recruitments – they often have subject matter expertise, extensive networks that include government, private industry and media, as well as access to information and places of intelligence value.”

“Recruited journalists’ accesses can be exploited to conduct or facilitate intelligence activity that includes access to otherwise inaccessible locations, actively collecting or using their media organisation’s database to gather information on targets, and assist in the cultivation of targets, including other journalists.”

Commonwealth agencies and officials are also advised by ASIO that “unapproved or unauthorised contact with journalists and the media carries risks for the security of government information.”

Noting that media content “informs the public about current events and ultimately influences readers”, ASIO warns that foreign spies also target and use journalists to “influence narratives on issues that matter to them – this constitutes foreign interference”.

It advises that all “engagement with journalists” must be officially authorised in strict accordance with Australian Government, departmental or agency-specific policies.

“Even where contact is authorised, determining whether a journalist or media organisation is legitimate, versus working for a foreign intelligence service, adds an additional layer of risk and complexity.”

ASIO reveals that it has for decades “identified and disrupted” foreign intelligence services posing as journalists and using journalists to target and cultivate Australians, but the document does not specify which nations are involved in the activity.

It does however cite an example of an incident overseas where a journalist working for a Chinese Communist Party linked newspaper was reportedly charged in the Czech Republic with ‘unauthorised activity on behalf of a foreign power’.

“As part of this cover, Yang (Yiming) conducted interviews with Czech politicians and businessmen. One Czech Government official stated they shared only their personal opinions and did not provide any information to Yang.”

“Although the official stated they did not provide any information to Yang, their personal opinions can contain privileged and sensitive content of potential significant intelligence value to a foreign intelligence service”.

ASIO’s latest assessment follows a joint statement issued by Five Eyes partners earlier this month, warning that Chinese spies were offering lucrative payments to government and military personnel as they attempt to steal sensitive secrets from the US and its allies.

“China’s military intelligence services ultimately seek to acquire privileged military, political and economic intelligence that can provide China with a strategic and tactical advantage over the Five Eyes,” the bulletin published in early June warned.

“Persons with either indirect or peripheral access to government information, e.g. academics, journalists, freelance writers, think tank employees, or anyone with links to defence, security, policy and economic sectors.”

ASIO Director General Mike Burgess has also previously warned that journalists, military veterans and judicial figures were all being targeted by foreign espionage agencies at “unprecedented” levels.

During his annual threat assessment in 2023, Mr Burgess revealed security agencies had detected “repeated attempts to hack into scores of Australian media outlets – so many, it appears to be a concerted campaign”.

He detailed how in one disrupted plot a “lackey” was recruited to lure “senior journalists” on all-expenses-paid “study tours” of a foreign country to obtain privileged information.

“Once in-country, the lackey was expected to introduce the journalists to ‘local officials’ who were really spies in disguise,” Mr Burgess revealed.

“The spies would use these opportunities to ingratiate themselves with the reporters, try to elicit insights on political, economic, defence and other issues, and identify any vulnerabilities that could be leveraged later.”

This week Mr Burgess is expected to deliver ASIO’s latest annual threat assessment which has been delayed by several months following the terrorist attack at Bondi beach in December which claimed 15 innocent lives.

The Nightly has asked ASIO which foreign states are suspected of targeting Australian journalists, but in line with long-standing practice the organisation has declined to comment.

“ASIO regularly engages with parliament, industry, academia, and other partners to build awareness of threats and provide protective security advice,” a spokesperson said.“Consistent with long-standing practice, ASIO does not comment on individuals, intelligence or operational matters,” the spokesperson added.